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Jurisdictional Statement 
This court has jurisdiction over this appeal pursuant to Utah Code§ 78A-4-
103(2)(e). 
The district court issued its Sentence, Judgment, Commitment in State v. 
Edgar, District Court Case No. 141400828, on June 24, 2015. (Add. A, R. 250-52.) 
Appellant Michael Edgar filed a timely notice of appeal on July 23, 2015. (R. 253-
54.) 
Statement of the Issues 
Issue: Was Mr. Edgar's counsel ineffective when he did not file a motion 
to suppress evidence found pursuant to an unconstitutionally prolonged traffic 
stop? 
Standard of Review: "A claim of ineffective assistance of counsel raised 
for the first time on appeal presents a question of law that the court reviews for 
correctness." State v. Lucero, 2014 UT 15, if 11,328 P.3d 841 (quotation omitted). 
Preservation: This issue is not preserved. But an "exception to the 
preservation requirement is where trial counsel's failure to preserve the issue in 
the trial court is the result of ineffective assistance of counsel." State v. Kozlov, 
2012 UT App 114, iJ 35, 276 P.3d 1207. 
1 
Determinative Provisions 
"The right of the people to be secure in their persons, houses, papers, and 
effects, against unreasonable searches and seizures, shall not be violated, and no 
warrants shall issue, but upon probable cause, supported by oath or affirmation, 
and particularly describing the place to be searched, and the persons or things to 
be seized." U.S. Const. amend. IV. 
Statement of the Case 
1. Nature of the Case and Course of Proceedings 
The State charged Appellant Michael Edgar with two counts of possession 
of a controlled substance in a drug-free zone, one count of possession of 
paraphernalia in a drug-free zone, one count of possession of a weapon by a 
restricted person, and one count of unlawful possession of another's 
identification. (R. 160-62.) 
After a trial, a jury found Mr. Edgar guilty of three counts-possession of 
~ methamphetamine in a drug-free zone, possession of drug paraphernalia in a 
drug-free zone, and possession of a weapon by a restricted person-and not 
guilty of the remaining two counts. (R. 216-20.) 
Mr. Edgar now appeals. 
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2. Statement of Facts 
Because Mr. Edgar is challenging the constitutionality of a search, the facts 
of the search are set forth in great detail. 
On March 15, 2014, at 7:34pm, a police officer observed a car changing 
lanes and II corning over without using his signal" although the car 11 [ e ]ventuall y 
used his signal." (Add. B, R. 276: 160; Trial Ex. 4 at 19:34.)1 The officer stopped 
the car at 7:35pm and approached the vehicle. (Trial Ex. 4 at 19:35.) The driver of 
the car was Mr. Edgar, and a passenger was in the front seat. (Add. B, R. 
276:162.) 
The officer spoke with the occupants of the car for approximately three 
minutes. (Trial Ex. 4 at 19:35-38.) During that time, the officer asked Mr. Edgar 
for his license and insurance, both of which were valid. (Add. B, R. 276:161.)2 In 
his interactions with Mr. Edgar, the officer noticed that Mr. Edgar's pupils were 
constricted, his voice was raspy, his hands were shaky, his facial features were 
relaxed, and he had a hard time getting his license out of his wallet. (Add. B, R. 
1 At trial, the State entered into evidence the video from the police officer's 
dash camera that was copied onto a disc. That video is referred to as "Trial Ex. 
4," and "19:34" and similar cites refer to the time stamp on the video. To view 
the video on the disc, first open the file titled "Player." Once the Player has 
opened, click on "Open File," and then on "19h33rn20s[0].dav." The time stamp 
on the video is in the upper right-hand corner. 
2 Mr. Edgar did not have a copy of his registration, but the officer checked 
his registration. (R. 276:161.) 
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276:126.) The officer used his flashlight to look in the backseat of the car before he 
returned to his vehicle, but at trial the officer did not remember looking in the 
car, and he did not testify that he saw anything of import. (Trial Ex. 4 at 19:38; 
Add. B, R. 276:163.) 
The officer returned to his patrol vehicle at 7:38 and called for backup for a 
DUI investigation and a drug-sniffing dog. (Trial Ex. 4 at 19:38; Add. C, R. 276:81; 
Add. B, R. 276: 128.) At 7:41, a voice over the radio asked if a K-9 unit was 
needed. (Trial Ex. 4 at 19:41.) The dispatcher responded affirmatively and gave 
the location where Mr. Edgar's car was stopped. (Id. at 19:41-42.) At 7:42, the 
voice stated that he could be there in "fifteen, maybe ten." (Id. at 19:42.) 
The officer remained in his patrol vehicle until a backup officer arrived at 
7:44. (Id. at 19:44.) At that point, both officers approached Mr. Edgar's car; the 
backup officer questioned Mr. Edgar, and the original officer questioned the 
passenger. (Id.) 
The backup officer questioned Mr. Edgar in his car about where he was 
going to and where he was coming from. (Add. C, R. 276:82.) The backup officer 
also noticed that Mr. Edgar had a raspy voice and was nervous, and his pupils 
were constricted. (Add. C, R. 276:82-83.) The backup officer questioned Mr. 
Edgar for about two minutes, until 7:46. (Trial Ex. 4 at 19:45-19:46.) 
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Both officers then left Mr. Edgar's car. (Trial Ex. 4 at 19:47.) The officers 
interacted with some pedestrians on the sidewalk for approximately one minute. 
(Id. at 19:47-48.) Then the officer who initiated the traffic stop moved his vehicle 
and parked behind another police car. (Id. at 19:48.) The dash camera's view of 
the Mr. Edgar's car is substantially blocked by another police cruiser for 
approximately two minutes, until 7:50, when that police cruiser moved. (Id. at 
19:48-50.) 
After the police cruiser moves, the dash camera shows another police 
vehicle parked behind Mr. Edgar's car and two police officers walking around 
Mr. Edgar's car and one officer walking back and forth on the sidewalk. (Id. at 
19:50-52.) Another police car arrives at 7:52. (Id. at 19:52.) 
The officers removed the occupants from the car around 7:55pm. (Id. at 
19:55.)3 The drug-sniffing dog approached Mr. Edgar's car at 7:58 and left the car 
3 There is a time discrepancy in the original officer's testimony. The officer 
testified that the backup officer removed Mr. Edgar from the car to perform field 
sobriety tests when the original officer moved his car. (Add. B, R. 267:128.) 
According to the dash camera video, the original officer moved his car at 7:48. 
(Trial Ex. 4 at 19:48.) However, the original officer also testified that the backup 
officer was performing field sobriety tests on Mr. Edgar while the dog sniff was 
occurring at 7:58, nearly ten minutes later. (Add. B, R. 267:128; Trial Ex. 4 at 
19:58-20:00.) The dash camera does not show the occupants of the vehicle 
outside of the car until 7:55. (Trial Ex. 4 at 19:55.) The original officer qualifies his 
testimony by saying that he didn't "know the time frame" when the K-9 officer 
arrived. (Add. B, R. 267:128.) Given the lack of clarity of the original officer's 
testimony, Mr. Edgar has chosen to rely on what can be seen in the dash camera 
video. 
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at approximately 8:00. (Id. at 19:58-20:00.) The officers performed field sobriety 
tests on Mr. Edgar at the same time the dog was sniffing the vehicle. (Add. B, R. 
267:128.) 
The dog alerted to the presence of drugs in the car. (Trial Ex. 4 at 19:58-
20:00.) The police found heroin, drug paraphernalia, and an axe in the car. (R. 
~ 276:129, 131-34, 136-37, 139-40, 142-43, 145.) The police arrested Mr. Edgar, 
searched him incident to arrest, and found methamphetamine. (R. 276:85, 149, 
152-53.) 
Summary of the Argument 
Mr. Edgar's attorney was ineffective when he did not file a motion to 
suppress evidence found pursuant to an unconstitutionally prolonged traffic 
stop. Although the traffic stop was lawful at its initiation, and the police had 
reasonable suspicion that Mr. Edgar was driving impaired, the police had no 
reasonable suspicion that Mr. Edgar had drugs in his car. The police delayed 12 
vJ minutes from the time they formed reasonable suspicion that Mr. Edgar was 
driving impaired until the time they performed field sobriety tests. During that 
time, the police were not diligently pursuing their investigation; rather, the dash 
camera video appears to show the police delaying the field sobriety tests until 
the drug-sniffing dog arrived. 
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Because the dog sniff of Mr. Edgar's car was contrary to the Fourth 
Amendment, the evidence seized as a result of that search should have been 
suppressed. Mr. Edgar was prejudiced because had his attorney moved to 
suppress the evidence, the motion would have been granted. Had the motion 
been granted, all the drug, drug paraphernalia, and weapon evidence would 
have been suppressed and Mr. Edgar would not have been convicted. 
Argument 
1. Mr. Edgar's counsel was ineffective. 
Mr. Edgar's trial counsel was ineffective when he did not file a motion to 
suppress the evidence found in the car. For claims of ineffective assistance of 
counsel, Mr. Edgar must satisfy the Strickland4 standard, which requires him to 
prove "(1) that counsel's performance was so deficient as to fall below an 
objective standard of reasonableness and (2) that but for counsel's deficient 
performance there is a reasonable probability that the outcome of the trial would 
have been different." State v. Larrabee, 2013 UT 70,118,321 P.3d 1136 (quotation 
omitted). "Where defense counsel's failure to litigate a Fourth Amendment claim 
competently is the principal allegation of ineffectiveness, the defendant must also 
prove that his Fourth Amendment claim is meritorious and that there is a 
reasonable probability that the verdict would have been different absent the 
See Strickland v. Washington, 466 U.S. 668, 687 (1984). 
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excludable evidence in order to demonstrate actual prejudice." State v. Stewart, 
2014 UT App 289, ,r 11, 340 P.3d 802 (quotation omitted). 
1.1 Mr. Edgar's counsel was deficient for not moving to suppress the 
evidence found in the car. 
Under the Fourth Amendment to the United States Constitution, police 
officers may temporarily detain a vehicle without a warrant if the officers have 
reasonable suspicion of criminal activity. See U.S. CONST. amend. IV; State v. 
JP Baker, 2010 UT 18, ,r 11, 229 P.3d 650. To determine whether a traffic stop is 
reasonable, courts decide (1) whether the "police officer's action was justified at 
its inception" and (2) whether the "detention following the stop was reasonably 
related in scope to the circumstances that justified the interference in the first 
place." Id. ,r 12 ( quotations omitted). 
"The length of a detention associated with a traffic stop can be properly 
extended if, during the scope of the traffic stop, the officer forms new reasonable 
articulable suspicion of criminal activity." State v. Simons, 2013 UT 3, ,r 17, 296 
P.3d 721 (quotation omitted). "[E]ven if reasonable suspicion of more serious 
vj criminal activity does arise, the scope of the stop is still limited." State v. Lafond, 
2003 UT App 101, il 14, 68 P.3d 1043 (quotation omitted). But in such a case 
where an officer forms new reasonable suspicion, the officer must "expediently 
investigate his new suspicion." Simons, 2013 UT 3, ,r 17 (quotation omitted). 
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"[O]fficers must diligently pursue a means of investigation that is likely to 
confirm or dispel their suspicions quickly." Id. (quotation omitted). "There is no 
bright-line test that indicates an appropriate length for a traffic-stop detention; 
rather, [courts] consider the totality of the circumstances surrounding the stop to 
determine whether the length and scope of the detention were reasonable." 
Baker, 2010 UT 18, ,r 17. 
Because dog sniffs are not considered searches under the Fourth 
Amendment, "a drug-trained dog may walk the perimeter of a lawfully detained 
vehicle even if police have no reasonable suspicion that the vehicle occupants are 
engaged in drug-related activity so long as the dog sniff search does not extend 
the duration of the stop." Id. ,r 29. But a seizure "can become unlawful if it is 
prolonged beyond the time reasonably required to complete that mission." Id. 
(quotation omitted). "[E]ven a small intrusion beyond the legitimate scope of an 
initially lawful search is unlawful under the Fourth Amendment." Id. ,r 28 
(quotation omitted). 
In this case, Mr. Edgar does not dispute that the traffic stop was justified at 
its inception- a police officer testified that he observed Mr. Edgar committing a 
traffic violation by changing lanes before turning on his signal. (Add. B, R. 276: 
9 
160.)5 Nor does Mr. Edgar dispute that the police officers formed new reasonable 
suspicion that Mr. Edgar was driving impaired when they observed Mr. Edgar's 
constricted pupils, raspy voice, and shaky hands. (Add. B, R. 276:126.) The issue 
here is the length of time it took the officers to dispel their suspicion; more 
specifically, the question is whether the officers delayed their administration of 
the field sobriety tests until the drug-sniffing dog arrived. 
The traffic stop began at 7:35pm. (Trial Ex. 4 at 19:35.) Three minutes later, 
at 7:38, the initiating officer returned to his patrol vehicle having formed new 
reasonable suspicion that Mr. Edgar was driving impaired. (Id. at 19:38; Add. B, 
R. 276:126.) The officer immediately called for backup and for a drug-sniffing 
dog. (Add. B, R. 276:128.) At 7:42, the officer was informed that it would take 10 
or 15 minutes for the drug-sniffing dog to arrive. (Trial Ex. 4 at 19:42.) A backup 
officer arrived at 7:44, and by 7:46, that officer had questioned Mr. Edgar and 
formed reasonable suspicion that Mr. Edgar was driving impaired. (Add. C, R. 
276:82-83.) 
By 7:46, both officers had questioned Mr. Edgar, and both had formed 
reasonable suspicion that he was driving impaired. (Add. C, R. 276:82-83; Add B, 
276:126; Trial Ex. 4 at 19:35-38, 45-46.) But it took the officers about 12 minutes to 
5 "A police officer is constitutionally justified in stopping a vehicle if the 
stop is incident to a traffic infraction committed in the officer's presence." State v. 
Gurule, 2013 UT 58,123,321 P.3d 1039 (quotation omitted). 
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perform the field sobriety tests, which were performed while the dog was 
sniffing the car. (Trial Ex. 4 at 19:55, 58-20:00; Add. B, R. 267:128.) In total, the 
officers waited approximately 12 minutes from the time they formed reasonable 
suspicion that Mr. Edgar was driving impaired until they performed the 
necessary field sobriety tests to investigate their suspicion. 6 
During that approximately 12-minute interlude, the officers interacted 
with pedestrians for about one minute (Trial Ex. 4 at 19:47-48), moved and 
6 In this analysis, Mr. Edgar has relied on the dash camera video and 
reconciled it with the original officer's testimony, even though that testimony is 
not entirely clear. But even if the officer's testimony is viewed in a very generous 
light, the evidence shows that Mr. Edgar's detention was impermissibly 
prolonged until the drug-sniffing dog arrived. If the original officer was correct 
and the backup officer started performing field sobriety tests on Mr. Edgar at 
7:48, the backup officer was still performing those tests at 7:58 when the drug 
sniffing dog arrived and continued to perform those tests for another two 
minutes until the dog finished. (Trial Ex. 4 at 19:48, 19:58-20:00; Add. B, R. 
267:128.) That means it took 12 minutes for the backup officer to perform the 
field sobriety tests. Although there is no evidence on the record on what tests the 
officer performed, the standard field sobriety tests consist of three short tests- a 
Horizontal Gaze Nystagmus where the officer sees if a person can follow his 
finger as he moves it horizontally across the person's field of vision; the Walk-
and-Tum test where the officer directs the person to walk heel-to-toe for a short 
number of steps and then turn around and walk another short amount of steps; 
and the One-Leg Stand where the person stands on one leg for 30 seconds. NAT'L 
HIGHWAY TRAFFIC SAFETY ADMINISTRATION, ADVANCED ROADSIDE IMPAIRED 
DRIVING ENFORCEMENT (2007), found athttp://oag.dc.gov/page/ sfst-training-
manuals. One court noted that field sobriety tests take less than one minute. See 
Best v. Berard, 837 F. Supp. 2d 933,941 (N.D. Ill. 2011). Here, there is no evidence 
that Mr. Edgar was not compliant, no evidence about how Mr. Edgar performed 
on each test, and no evidence explaining why a relatively short procedure last 12 
minutes. 
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v; 
~ 
parked a police cruiser (Id. at 19:48), and waited outside Mr. Edgar's car and 
walked back and forth on the sidewalk. (Id. at 19:50-52.) The officers performed 
field sobriety tests on Mr. Edgar while the dog was sniffing the car. (Add. B, R. 
276:128.) 
The Utah Supreme Court has made very clear that police officers cannot 
conduct dog sniffs on vehicles after the lawful purposes of the stop have 
concluded. Baker, 2010 UT 18, ,r 33. But" a de minimis extension of a traffic stop 
is not unconstitutional." Simons, 2013 UT 3, ,r 38. Yet in this instance, the police 
officers improperly extended the lawful purposes of the stop so that the dog 
could conduct its sniff. Contrary to the Utah Supreme Court's direction, the 
officers did not "expediently investigate [their] new suspicion" or "diligently 
pursue a means of investigation that [was] likely to confirm or dispel their 
suspicions quickly." Id. ,r 17 (quotations omitted). Although the law does not 
require officers to "move a top speed," the "officer's overall course of action 
~ during a traffic stop, viewed objectively and in its totality, must be reasonably 
directed toward the proper ends of the stop." Id. ,r 33 (quotations omitted). 
~ Here, the officers' course of conduct during the traffic stop was not 
reasonably directed towards ending the stop or quickly investigating their 
suspicion of impaired driving. Instead, their actions indicate delay until the 
arrival of the drug-sniffing dog. At 7:42, the officers knew that it would take 10 to 
12 
15 minutes for the drug-sniffing dog to arrive. Both officers formed their 
reasonable suspicion at 7:46, but did not perform the sobriety tests until 7:58, 
when the dog was sniffing the car. 
The officers waited 12 minutes to pursue an investigation that would 
confirm or dispel their suspicions quickly- the field sobriety tests. And the dash 
cam video does not establish that during those 12 minutes the officers were 
diligently pursuing their investigation; rather, the video shows the officers 
moving a car and walking around on the sidewalk. (Trial Ex. 4 at 19:48, 50-52.) 
Nothing in the video or the officers' testimony at trial justifies the 12-minute 
delay in the administration of the sobriety tests. Those crucial minutes constitute 
a "nontrivial period of [Mr. Edgar's] detention from the initial stop to the dog 
alert when the officers were not conducting proper follow-up." United States v. 
Vazquez, 555 F.3d 923, 929 (10th Cir. 2009). 
Courts have held that officers extending or delaying their investigation to 
wait for the arrival of a drug-sniffing dog-without additional reasonable 
suspicion-violates the Fourth Amendment. For example, the Sixth Circuit held 
that an officer asking six minutes of extraneous questions and waiting for an 
additional three and a half minutes for a canine sniff unreasonably prolonged the 
stop, especially when there was insufficient evidence that the police were 
diligently pursuing their investigation. United States v. Stepp, 680 F.3d 651, 663-64 
13 
(6th Cir. 2012); see also United States v. Hight, No. 15-CR-00060-LTB, 2015 WL 
4239003, at *5 (D. Colo. June 29, 2015) (reasoning that an officer sitting in his car 
for 11 minutes, where most of his time was spent filling out forms and waiting 
for an officer to arrive to investigate an unrelated crime, unconstitutionally 
extended the duration of the stop); United States v. $167,070.00 in U.S. Currency, 
No. 3:13-CV-00324-LRH, 2015 WL 3658069, at *9 (D. Nev. June 12, 2015) 
(reasoning that officers conducting redundant records checks to prolong stop to 
allow for a canine sniff without additional reasonable suspicion made the 
prolongation of the stop unreasonable). 
This court has considered a 10- to 15-minute detention of passengers while 
waiting for dog sniff to be "a substantial period." State v. Hurt, 2010 UT App 33, 
,r 11-12, 227 P.3d 271. And the Utah Supreme Court held that officers' call to 
request a canine unit and their call to Adult Probation and Parole was not a de 
minimis extension of a lawful traffic stop because the officers did not have 
~ reasonable suspicion that the detained driver possessed or distributed illegal 
drugs. State v. Gurule, 2013 UT 58, ,r,r 38, 40, 321 P.3d 1039. 
It is true that officers may prolong a stop for the arrival of a drug-detection 
dog if the officers have reasonable suspicion that the occupants of the car are 
transporting drugs. See State v. Juma, 2012 UT App 27, ,rs, 270 P.3d 564 ("[G]iven 
that during the course of the traffic stop the officer developed the additional 
14 
reasonable suspicion that Juma and the driver might be transporting drugs, he 
therefore had a lawful basis to temporarily continue to detain them to investigate 
.... his suspicions by deploying his drug-detection canine."); United States v. 
Vaughan, 700 F.3d 705, 712 (4th Cir. 2012) (noting that approximately 7-minute 
delay of stop to do dog sniff was not unreasonable because officers had 
reasonable suspicion of drug activity based on occupant's conflicting 
explanations for travel). 
But here, the officers did not have reasonable suspicion that Mr. Edgar 
possessed or distributed drugs. "[R]easonable suspicion must be supported by 
specific and articulable facts and rational inferences, and cannot be merely an 
inchoate and unparticularized suspicion or hunch." Gurule, 2013 UT 58, ,r 32 
(quotation omitted). Admittedly, the officers here did have reasonable suspicion 
that Mr. Edgar was driving impaired. But the officers did not have reasonable 
suspicion that the car contained drugs or that Mr. Edgar was involved in the 
transport of drugs. 
Here, the officers noticed that Mr. Edgar's pupils were constricted, his 
voice was raspy, his hands were shaky, his facial feahires were relaxed, he had a 
hard time getting his license out of his wallet, he was nervous, and he was 
distracted. (Add. C, R. 276:81-82; Add. B, R. 276:126.) These behaviors, according 
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to the original officer, were a "possible indication of drugs" and he called for 
backup for a DUI investigation. (Add. B, R. 276:126.) 
But beyond behaviors that indicated that Mr. Edgar was driving impaired, 
the officers did not testify about any specific facts or rational inferences that led 
them to believe that Mr. Edgar had drugs in the car. The dash camera video 
~ shows the original officer shining his flashlight to look in the backseat of the car 
after he initiated the traffic stop, but the officer testified at trial that he did not 
remember doing that; consequently, he did not testify that he saw anything of 
import in the car. (Trial Ex. 4 at 19:38; Add. B, R. 276:163.) Similarly, the backup 
officer shone his flashlight in Mr. Edgar's car during his interaction with Mr. 
~ 
Edgar but did not testify that he saw anything in the car that was drug-related. 
(Add. C, R. 276:82-83.) The officers also did not testify that Mr. Edgar had any 
warrants or that Mr. Edgar had a history of drug distribution. 
In short, nothing in the record indicates that the officers had articulable, 
~ reasonable suspicion to believe that Mr. Edgar had drugs in the car. Short of that, 
the officers could not prolong the traffic stop to wait for the arrival of a drug-
~ sniffing dog. What the officers did suspect was impaired driving, but the officers 
waited approximately 12 minutes to investigate their suspicions by performing 
field sobriety tests. During those 12 minutes, the officers were not expeditiously 
or diligently pursuing their investigation; rather, the dash camera video and the 
16 
testimony at trial indicate that the officers were waiting for the drug-sniffing dog 
to arrive. The dog sniff of Mr. Edgar's car violated the Fourth Amendment. 
Evidence "obtained in unreasonable searches and seizures in violation of 
the Fourth Amendment is excluded from criminal proceedings." State v. Harker, 
2010 UT 56, ,I 17, 240 P.3d 780. "The exclusionary rule applies not only to 
evidence obtained directly as a result of the illegal seizure, but also to evidence 
obtained by exploitation of the illegality, unless the evidence was obtained by 
means sufficiently distinguishable to be purged of the primary taint." State v. 
Ramirez, 817 P.2d 774, 786 (Utah 1991) (quotations omitted). 
Because the dog sniff violated the Fourth Amendment, the evidence found 
in the car- specifically, the heroin, the drug paraphernalia, and the axe- should 
have been suppressed. Moreover, the officers arrested Mr. Edgar because of the 
drugs found in the car. (R. 276:166.) Incident to that arrest, the officers searched 
Mr. Edgar and found methamphetamine. (R. 276:85, 149, 152-53.) Because Mr. 
Edgar was arrested as a result of illegally obtained evidence, the evidence found 
on him during the search incident to arrest- the methamphetamine- should also 
be excluded. 
Given the lengthy analysis above, Mr. Edgar's trial counsel performed 
deficiently by not bringing a motion to suppress the evidence found in the car. 
The impermissibility of prolonging a traffic detention without reasonable 
17 
suspicion was well-established in several Utah cases before Mr. Edgar's trial 
began. See, e.g., Baker, 2010 UT 18; Simons, 2013 UT 3; Juma, 2012 UT App 27; Hurt, 
2010 UT App 33. Trial counsel should have been aware of these precedents and 
their application to this case. Because trial counsel failed to file a motion to 
suppress-which would have suppressed all the drug, drug paraphernalia, and 
~ weapon evidence in the case- trial counsel performed deficiently. 
1.2 Mr. Edgar was prejudiced. 
"Once a defendant demonstrates that his trial counsel's performance was 
deficient, [a court] must then determine whether the deficient performance 
resulted in prejudice." State v. Lenkart, 2011 UT 27, ,r 38, 262 P.3d 1. "This 
requires showing that counsel's errors were so serious as to deprive the 
~ defendant of a fair trial, and that there is a reasonable probability that, but for 
counsel's unprofessional errors, the result of the proceeding would have been 
~ different." Id. (quotations omitted)." A reasonable probability is a probability 
sufficient to undermine confidence in the outcome." Id. 
Mr. Edgar was undoubtedly prejudiced by his counsel's failure to file a 
motion to suppress. As demonstrated above, the motion to suppress would have 
been granted, and consequently all the drug, drug paraphernalia, and weapon 
evidence would have been excluded. Without evidence of the 
18 
methamphetamine, the drug paraphernalia, and the axe, ~fr. Edgar could not 
have been convicted of possession of the methamphetamine, possession of the 
drug paraphernalia, or possession of a weapon by a restricted person. The 
motion to suppress altered the "entire evidentiary picture," id., and ~1r. Edgar 
would not have been convicted. 
Conclusion 
Mr. Edgar's attorney was deficient for not filing a motion to suppress 
evidence that was found in violation of the Fourth Amendment. Specifically, that 
evidence was found after a dog sniff of Mr. Edgar's vehicle, but Mr. Edgar's 
detention to wait for the dog sniff was impermissibly prolonged because the 
police officers lacked reasonable suspicion that Mr. Edgar was transporting 
drugs. Consequently, all the drug, drug paraphernalia, and weapon evidence 
should have been suppressed. Mr. Edgar was prejudiced by his counsel's failures 
because ·without the evidence, he could not have been convicted. 
~fr. Edgar requests that his court overturn his convictions because his trial 
counsel 1sas ineffective. 
DA. TED this 1-Hh da\· of December, 2015. 
Emily .A:-darns (14937) 
ADA\!S LEGAL LLC 
PO Box 156-1 
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Addendum A 
Sentence, Judgment, Commitment in State v. Edgar, District Court Case No. 
141400828, on June 24, 2015 (R. 250-52) 
4TH DISTRICT COURT - PROVO 
UTAH COUNTY, STATE OF UTAH 
STATE OF UTAH, 
Plaintiff, 
vs. 
MICHAEL JOHN EDGAR, 
Defendant. 
custody: Utah County Jail 
PRESENT 
Clerk: treenah 
Prosecutor: JOHNSON, CRAIG R 
Defendant 
Defendant's Attorney(s): STEWART, GREGORY V 
DEFENDANT INFORMATION 
Date of birth: September 16, 1980 
Audio 
Tape Number: 301-15 Tape Count: 11:36 
CHARGES 
MINUTES 
SENTENCE, JUDGMENT, COMMITMENT 
Case No: 141400828 FS 
Judge: LYNN W DAVIS 
Date: June 24, 2015 
1. POSSESSION OR USE OF A CONTROLLED SUBSTANCE - 2nd Degree Felony 
Plea: Guilty - Disposition: 04/17/2015 Guilty 
3. USE OR POSSESSION OF DRUG PARAPHERNALIA - Class A Misdemeanor 
Plea: Guilty - Disposition: 04/17/2015 Guilty 
4. UNLAW POSS/PURCH/TRANS DANGEROUS WEAPON - Class A Misdemeanor 
Plea: Guilty - Disposition: 04/17/2015 Guilty 
5. DRIVING UNDER THE INFLUENCE OF ALCOHOL/DRUGS - Class B Misdemeanor 
- Disposition: 04/16/2015 Dismissed w/ Prejudi 
SENTENCE PRISON 
FILEDt 
JUN 2 4 2015 
4 i'H DISTAICT 
STATE OF UTAH 
UTAH Co0Nrv 
Based on the defendant's conviction of POSSESSION OR USE OF A CONTROLLED SUBSTANCE a 
2nd Degree Felony, the defendant is sentenced to an indeterminate term of not less than 
one year nor more than fifteen years in the Utah State Prison. 
COMMITMENT is to begin immediately. 
To the UTAH County Sheriff: The defendant is remanded to your custody for 
transportation to the Utah State Prison where the defendant will be confined. 
SENTENCE PRISON CONCURRENT/CONSECUTIVE NOTE 
Printed: 06/25/15 08:08:45 Paqe 1 of 3 
Case No: 141400828 Date: Jun 24, 2015 
Court sentences defendant to 257 days on each of the Class A Misdemeanors with credit 
for time served on each to run concurrent. Sentence to run concurrent. 
SENTENCE RECOMMENDATION NOTE 
Court recommends Defendant not serve a lengthy sentence. Court recommends defendant be ~ 
given credit for time served of 257 days, the court also recommends defendant 
participate in the Conquest Program. 
SENTENCE JAIL 
Based on the defendant's conviction of USE OR POSSESSION OF DRUG PARAPHERNALIA a Class 
A Misdemeanor, the defendant is sentenced to a term of 365 day(s) The total time 
suspended for this charge is 108 day(s). 
Based on the defendant's conviction of UNLAW POSS/PURCH/TRANS DANGEROUS WEAPON a Class 
A Misdemeanor, the defendant is sentenced to a term of 365 day(s) The total time 
suspended for this charge is 108 day(s). 
Credit is granted for 257 day(s) previously served. 
SENTENCE FINE 
Charge# l Fine: $1000.00 
Charge# 3 
Charge# 4 
Suspended: $1000.00 
Due: $0.00 
Fine: $2500.00 
Suspended: $2500.00 
Due: $0.00 
Fine: $2500.00 
Suspended: $2500.00 
Due: $0.00 
Total Fine: $6000.00 
Total Suspended: $6000.00 
Total Surcharge: $0 
Total Principal Due: $0 
Plus Interest 
CUSTODY 
The defendant is present in the custody of the Utah County jail. 
Printed: 06/25/15 08:08:45 
Paqe 2 of 3 
case No: 141400828 Date: Jun 24, 2015 
STAMP USED AT 
Printed: 06/25/15 08:08:45 Paqe 3 of 3 
AddendumB 
Excerpts from the testimony of the original officer (R. 126-28, 160-63) 
v 
1 
2 Q 
THE COURT: It may. 
(BY MR. JOHNSON) During this time what are you 
3 asking of the defendant? 
4 A I'm asking the defendant for his driver's license, 
5 insurance, registration documents, advising him why I stopped 
6 him and then I'm just asking, I did ask him where he was 
7 going or where he was coming from. 
8 Q Did the defendant indicate whether he was familiar 
9 with the area or not? 
10 A Yeah, he told me that he wasn't familiar with the 
11 area. 
12 
13 
Q Okay. While you're observing the defendant there, 
obviously the dash cam doesn't see inside the car from your 
14 angle. What sort of behavior are you seeing in the 
15 defendant? 
16 
17 
A Well, I'm speaking with Mr. Edgar. I first notice 
that his pupils are constricted. That was the first clue of 
18 possible indication of drugs. Next I noticed raspy voice. I 
19 notice his hands were shaky. I notice his face features 
20 appeared to be loose, relaxed, kind of and then when he was 
21 obtaining his driver's license out of his wallet he was 
22 
23 
24 
having a hard time obtaining his license out of his wallet. 
Q 
A 
What did he finally provide you? 
I asked for three documents and I was provided two 
25 documents, one Utah Driver's license for Michael Edgar and an 
126 
1 
2 
insurance card, no registration. And also while I'm sitting 
here I also asked, also see that the passenger has, I can see 
3 his eyes look constricted also so I asked him for his ID and 
4 he provided me a Utah, I think it was identification card. 
5 i 
6 
7 
8 
Q 
A 
Q 
A 
Who did you identify the passenger as? 
Zach Cassingham, it might be Zachary. 
Okay. And the audio kicks on pretty soon here? 
Yeah, I'll get in my car, take it out of the 
9 docking station, put it on my belt and turn it on. 
10 
11 
12 
13 
14 
15 
16 
Q 
A 
Once the audio kicks on we'll just listen to that. 
Okay. 
Q The audio came on about 19:38, does that sound 
about right? 
A Yeah. 
(Audio begins at 1:35:48, plays to 1:48:36 -
No transcription - police radio, over talking) 
17 Q (BY MR. JOHNSON) Which officer pulls up there at 
18 19:52:40? 
19 
20 
21 
22 
23 
24 
25 
A I believe that is Sargent (Inaudible). 
MR. JOHNSON: For the record I stopped it at 
19:53:00. Can you turn the lights back up please? 
Q (BY MR. JOHNSON) So, Detective Sager, what goes on 
after that interview? What did you do as far as the stop, 
you've got Officer Peterson there. How does the investigation 
progress? Did you call out for any other officers? 
127 
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1 A Well, in the beginning after I called for Officer 
2 Peterson I called also for a canine unit and Officer Thurston 
3 responded to my request and was en route. And then when I 
4 moved my car Officer Peterson was getting Mr. Edgar out of 
5 the vehicle to do field sobriety tests. At that point, I 
6 don't know the time frame, but relatively shortly Officer 
7 Thurston came. I believe I had a discussion with him, 
8 telling him what I seen. He said he was going to run his 
9 canine. While Officer Peterson was performing field sobriety 
10 tests, Officer Thurston ran the canine around the vehicle 
11 after which - before that he asked me to remove the passenger 
12 for his safety or to have that passenger exit the vehicle. 
13 So I had that -
So -14 
15 
Q 
A - passenger exit before the canine went around the 
16 vehicle. 
17 Q When Officer Thurston's canine went around the 
18 vehicle, who was in the car? 
No one. 19 
20 
21 
22 
A 
Q 
A 
Q 
Okay. So Mr. Edgar was also removed from the car? 
Yeah, no passengers. 
And were you present or nearby when the canine hit 
23 on the car -
24 A I was nearby. I'd be watching the people to make 
25 officer safety. 
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1 I MR. JOHNSON: Okay. I just want to check with the 
2 clerk. 
3 Have all the exhibits been admitted that we've 
4 tried? 
5 
6 
7 
8 
9 
10 
11 
12 
13 
14 
15 
16 
17 
18 
19 
20 
21 
22 
23 
24 
25 
Okay. That's all the questions I have for this 
witness. 
THE COURT: Cross examination? 
CROSS EXAMINATION 
BY MR. STEWART: 
Q So when you originally stopped Mr. Edgar again, it 
was because he had crossed the white line, crossed the 
dividing line without signaling? 
A 
Q 
A 
Q 
Drifting and coming over without using his signal. 
Okay. 
Eventually used his signal. 
Okay. And is it just the video that makes it look 
like everybody's got their blinker on all the time or is 
that ... 
A 
Q 
I don't know. 
Okay. All right. Anyway, you activated your 
lights before you got to the stoplight and turned them off; 
is that right? 
Yes, sir. A 
Q And when the light turned green again Mr. Edgar was 
signaling he was going to turn, you activated your lights 
160 
1 again? 
2 
3 
4 
5 
A 
Q 
A 
Q 
Yes, sir. 
Initiated the stop? 
Yes, sir. 
Okay. And this wasn't in the audio portion of the 
6 deal but you quickly approached the driver's side, you asked 
7 
8 
9 
for his license, his registration and proof of insurance? 
A I believe so, yeah. Yes. 
Q Okay. And he was able to provide his driver 
10 license? 
11 
12 
13 
14 
A 
Q 
A 
Q 
15 insurance? 
16 
17 
18 
19 
20 
21 
22 
23 
24 
25 
A 
Q 
A 
Q 
A 
Q 
A 
Q 
A 
Q 
Yeah. 
And that was valid? 
Yeah. 
And that he was able to provide insurance, proof of 
Yeah. 
And that was valid, you checked that? 
Yeah, I believe, yeah. 
And he didn't provide any registration information? 
No. 
But you checked that? 
Yeah. 
And who was the vehicle registered to? 
I don't remember. 
Do you have your vehicle impound report there? 
161 
1 
2 
3 
4 
5 
6 
Sure do. 
Can you look at that? 
Yep. 
Whose the owner/registrant there? 
A 
Q 
A 
Q 
A The owner is - the first name is spelled, A-R-J-A 
and then I think it's spelled, A-A-L-T-O-N-E-N. I'm trying 
7 to read her writing, sorry. 
8 
9 
10 
11 
12 
13 
14 
15 
16 
Q 
A 
Q 
Okay. Did you fill that out? 
I didn't. 
Okay. But Mr. Edgar is not the registered owner of 
the vehicle? 
A 
Q 
No. 
Okay. Did you followup with the registered owner 
of the vehicle? 
A 
Q 
I didn't. 
Okay. You also got - and again, I don't think this 
17 is on the audio portion but after you got that information 
18 
19 
20 
21 
22 
23 
24 
25 
from Mr. Edgar you went around the other side of the vehicle 
and you contacted the passenger? 
A 
Q 
A 
Q 
Mr. Edgar? 
A 
I did. 
And you got an ID from him? 
Prior to going over there. 
Mr. Edgar passed it across or he passed it across 
I think, yeah. 
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1 
2 
3 
4 
Q Okay. So you had that in hand, so why did you go 
around the car? Just to look in the back window? 
A 
Q 
When Officer Peterson was over there? 
No, when you went around before you went back to 
5 your car to turn on the audio, put your mike on. 
6 
7 
8 
9 
10 
11 
12 
13 
14 
15 
16 
17 
18 
19 
20 
21 
22 
A 
Q 
A 
Q 
A 
Q 
A 
Q 
A 
Q 
A 
Q 
A 
Q 
A 
I don't remember doing that. 
Okay. Who was the passenger? 
Casey or no, Zachary. 
Zachary Laman Caseyham? 
Sure. 
Does that sound -
I'd have to check. 
Okay. 
Cassingham sounds familiar. 
Cassingham, Zachary Raymond Cassingham? 
Zachary Zachary Cassingham, yep. 
Date of birth 8/25/87? 
I don't know, I'm going to have to look real quick. 
Well, just -
I remember it was '87. I remember '87 but I don't 
remember the other. 
Q Can't be too many Zachary Raymond Cassinghams out 
23 there. 
24 
25 
A 
Q 
Was that off my report you got that? 
It is. 
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AddendumC 
Excerpts from the testimony of the backup officer (R. 81-83) 
1 Q And tell the jury just a little bit, what does a 
2 patrol officer do. 
3 A A patrol officer makes traffic stops, takes calls 
4 of service, responds to help for whatever reasons, as far 
5 
6 
7 
8 
9 
calls or motor assists go. 
Q And on that date around 7:30 that night did you 
assist Detective Sager in a DUI investigation? 
A Yes. 
Q And where did you respond to? 
10 A Approximate address of 2100 North and State Street 
11 in Lehi. 
12 Q And did you interact with the driver of the vehicle 
13 
14 
15 
16 
17 
that was stopped by Detective Sager? 
A 
Q 
A 
Q 
I did. 
Okay, do you recognize him in the courtroom today? 
Yes. 
Can you identify him for the jury, something he's 
18 wearing, point him out? 
19 
20 
21 
22 
23 
24 
25 
A Michael Edgar wearing the white dress shirt and 
tie. 
MR. JOHNSON: Let the record reflect the defendant 
has been identified. 
THE COURT: It may. 
Q (BY MR. JOHNSON) Did you speak to him initially on 
scene there by his car? 
81 
1 
2 
3 
4 
5 
6 
7 
8 
9 
10 
11 
12 
13 
14 
15 
16 
17 
18 
19 
20 
21 
22 
23 
24 
25 
A 
Q 
A 
Yes. 
And what sort of things did you guys talk about? 
I made contact with Michael Edgar, talking with 
him, trying to figure out where he's going. He said he 
wasn't from around here, trying to figure out where he's 
coming from, if he's lost or kind of just where he's at. 
Q Okay. During that conversation did you talk about 
his family at all or ... 
A 
Q 
A 
Yeah. 
What did he say? 
Ummm, his behavior was abnormal so I asked him 
where he was going and he said he was worried about his wife, 
there was some health concerns with her and he was trying to 
figure out a way to get home because that's where he said he 
was going. 
Q 
A 
Q 
Okay, did he say where home was or ... 
I don't recall. 
Okay. All right. Can you describe your behavior 
while, during this conversation the two of you were having? 
A As I was talking with him he appeared to be very 
nervous, he was looking around, very distracted. It was 
nighttime so I have my flashlight shined in the car, just 
some of his behaviors. His voice was very raspy and I make a 
lot of traffic stops throughout the day and he wasn't acting 
normal as to the other drivers I'd pulled over. He was very 
L ___ ----- 82 
1 anxious. I notice that his pupils were very constricted and I 
2 had my light and I would shine it in the car and then I could 
3 kind of move it to see if his pupils would react and his 
pupils weren't reacting in the dark or the light which I 
found odd especially at nighttime. 
4 
5 
6 Q Okay. So as the result of that behavior did you act 
7 at Detective Sager's direction and perform some field 
sobriety tests in this incident? 
Yes. 
8 
9 
10 
11 
12 
13 
14 
15 
16 
A 
Q Okay. After doing that did you become aware of any 
search of his car that was done at the same time? 
A Yes. 
Q 
A 
Q 
A 
Okay, and did you end up arresting the defendant? 
Yes. 
Why was that? 
For drugs that were found in the car as well as 
17 DUI. 
18 
19 
20 
21 
Q Okay. After he was arrested did you take him to 
your patrol vehicle? 
A Yes. 
Q And did anything noteworthy happen in walking to 
22 your patrol vehicle? 
23 
24 
25 
MR. STEWART: Judge, can we approach? 
THE COURT: You may. 
(Whereupon a sidebar was held as follows: 
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